There is much we can learn from economic principles for the challenges that our economy faces; hence my focus today is on "Economic Principles, Government Policy and the Market Crisis." In reacting to the dramatic challenges of our day and confronting unprecedented concerns, it is easy for policymakers not to internalize some of the crucial implications of economic principles for the new and challenging contexts that they confront. Financial economics has much to contribute to current policy discussions. From a research perspective these debates suggest interesting issues for financial theory and financial economics more generally.
*Invited Address, Western Finance Association, June 19, 2009 The implications of such themes as (1) utility maximization and market clearing, (2) resource constraints, (3) the costliness of policy uncertainty and benefits to predictability and (4) the forward-looking nature of economic incentives are important for evaluating policy. These concepts are relevant for understanding such issues as deleveraging and changes in the availability of credit, changes in the provision of public goods, predictability and government policy, and the broad nature of information and capital injections, systemic risk and bank supervision. I won't explicitly discuss the import of adverse selection and moral hazard since those themes have received relatively more attention in the crisis, or despite my prior service at the SEC, the now much maligned and misunderstood repeal of uptick restrictions on short sales. 
Deleveraging and the Availability of Credit
Deleveraging and the closely related contraction of credit are central to the evolution of our economy in the financial crisis. In the initial portion of my comments I'd like to highlight how current events are affecting the supply and demand for loans and loan pricing. As a byproduct of declining housing values and elevated expected housing loan losses, valuation declines for these loans were even larger than expected loan losses due to liquidity and risk aversion induced state-price declines.
2 Without weighing in on the extensive debate about "mark to market accounting," the economic relevance of the valuation of loans can be appreciated by pointing to the fundamental maturity mismatch 1 The current attention being paid by the SEC to the reinstatement of pricing restrictions on short sales does illustrate the growing politicization of financial regulation (e.g., see Sirri (2009) and Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2009) The dynamics of valuations and therefore, the precise states in which default is optimal, reflect the joint evolution of discount rates and payoffs. 4 Additionally, Diamond and Rajan (2009) experience calls into question the way in which our economy bears and allocates the correlated risks in mortgage loans, especially for debt contracts with tiny down payments.
One barrier to the ability of financial institutions to deleverage was pre-existing credit lines. In particular, the "breaking of the buck" by Reserve Fund and its related suspension of liquidity led to a half-trillion dollar run on the money market fund industry, which in turn helped feed a collapse of commercial paper and aggressive drawing of credit lines. Financial institutions learned that the credit lines that they had issued were not as diversifiable as they thought in that in weak states of the economy the option to draw on existing credit lines would be heavily exercised. 6 My suspicion is that bank pleas to companies last fall to not draw their lines were counterproductive and that some companies even increased their draws in response because of resulting concerns about the bank's liquidity or possible cancellation of the credit line. What then are the implications of this for credit lines in the future? Due to the aggregate nature of the risk, I anticipate that lower credit lines will be offered at relatively higher spreads than in the past and that new types of credit lines could arise that would be contingent upon aggregate variables, such as offering an option on credit except in particularly problematic aggregate circumstances.
6 Some related empirical evidence concerning the exercise of credit lines and tightening of commercial paper is provided in Gao and Yun (2009) . Not surprisingly, the reduction in commercial paper and exercise of credit lines was particularly pronounced in the fall of 2008 among lower quality credits. Analogously, the supply of bank funding for lower quality credits may have been squeezed out by the need of larger, higher quality credits to substitute their funding sources. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2009) documents a run on credit lines. Bank lending during the crisis is examined by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) .
The consequences of deleveraging by consumers and the financial crisis for the macroeconomy are obviously very important. We observed a dramatic decline in wealth as illustrated by the huge decline in equity values from their peak to the present and a more than 50% decline from the prior peak to the trough. Unlike other recessions in recent decades this decline in equity pricing was accompanied by dramatic reductions in the values of residential and commercial real estate, so the overall permanent wealth effect is much larger than in other recessions. 7 These changes in asset values have been so sharp that they have jeopardized many lenders and have had profound consequences for the economy. During earlier booms many felt that "the consumer" drove much of those booms, so in reverse, the wealth effect should substantially reduce consumer demand after the large adverse shock to wealth. Additionally, many consumers learned last year that the rates of return that they were anticipating from asset markets had been far too high and that their savings had been inadequate. Indeed, investors now realize that they cannot count on measured savings rates near zero to provide adequate savings and more significant savings rates and reduced consumption have emerged. 8 At the same time, the decline in asset prices over the last two years reflects higher required returns, including risk premium.
While an obvious consequence of the current low state of the economy is reduced demand for lending as well as reduced supply of available funds due to limited bank and market capital, the borrowing opportunities for "risky" borrowers are likely to continue to 7 Not all of this may yet be reflected in prices due to infrequent trading. 8 The standard theoretical argument is that the impact of changes in returns on saving is actually ambiguous because of the combination of income and substitution effects. For example, higher perceived returns would increase savings due to a substitution (price) effect, but decrease savings due to an income (wealth) effect that increases current consumption.
be limited during and after the "recovery" as a result of supply responses. First, suppliers of funds have learned (relative to the past) about the riskiness of weak credits.
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Secondly, changes in the rules of the game with respect to high-risk borrowers and potential fears of further changes in the rules will make lenders particularly reluctant to lend to weak borrowers going forward. Both the relative treatment of automobile bondholders compared to UAW debt claimants and credit card legislation that makes it more difficult to raise rates on delinquent borrowers illustrate this theme. This highlights both actions by the government that are adverse to investors and the increase in political and regulatory risk, particularly for funding high-risk and politically sensitive borrowers, which will affect their access to private investor capital. 10 These risks are ones that we need to understand much better. Indeed, many observers have noted that the District of
Columbia is now at the center of our capital markets.
Public Goods, Fiscal Policy and Resource Constraints
Considerable attention has focused recently upon the federal government's use of fiscal stimulus to offset some of the economic contraction induced by the extraordinary financial shocks. However, wealth effects raise interesting issues about the composition of the stimulus. To explore this, I'd like to suggest a simple static model. Suppose there are a set of n identical consumers whose utility function has as arguments private goods and "public goods." 11 As in the tradition in public finance, we'll assume that the "public goods" are not excludible so that the same units of the public goods are being consumed by all-of course, the consumers consume distinct units of the private goods. Consider then the impact of an increase in wealth across consumers for the demand for the public goods as well as the private goods. A standard assumption on preferences in the neoclassical consumer model with private goods is that the demand for these private goods is normal, i.e., demand for each good increases in wealth, so we just extend that to the "public goods" as well. Of course, in the face of reduced wealth we would optimally allocate less resources compared to the prior optimal to the "public goods" that are normal goods as well as to the private goods. 12 However, increased purchases of "public goods," i.e., government spending, move the allocation of the public goods in the opposite direction.
This raises interesting issues about the composition of fiscal stimulus and whether policymakers should use tax cuts or government spending to offset the liquidity shocks and wealth effects that arise in "bad" states. Of course, the traditional perspectives on this issue highlight that (a) tax cuts are saved as well as consumed, the "Keynesian" argument in favor of increased government spending rather than tax cuts, and that (b) tax cuts have desirable incentive affects, an argument against increased government spending. My argument above in isolation would suggest that given the significant reduction in wealth experienced that we should decrease the supply and equilibrium quantity of the public goods, along with the private goods themselves that are naturally adjusting and for which the tax cuts only offset to a limited degree. 13 This effect is potentially much stronger in the current recession than typical recessions because of the very large wealth effects that now reduce indirect utility.
14 There is an interesting analogy to this in corporate finance-one choice that is open to firms with excess resources is to pay dividends rather than undertake new projects that
were not previously viewed as optimal. Of course, in the corporate finance context the firm certainly should not undertake projects that fail the net present value test. Once we recognize that in the current policy context that not all additional government spending adds to utility compared to the alternatives, it would be helpful to focus "stimulus" on the specific projects that will benefit consumers and the economy over time because of their shorter-term stimulus or long-term utility benefits, such as those public goods that are "inferior," i.e.., have demand declining in wealth. For example, with respect to composition of the public goods this latter point suggests in the low wealth states relatively more spending on goods such as job retraining and health insurance for children that are at least arguably "inferior" goods as compared to those whose demand increases in wealth (e.g., new highways and other infrastructure improvements).
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Recent events highlight the role of budget and resource constraints. 16 Indeed, many have expressed concern about the projected explosion in the debt to GDP ratio, which is not simply a consequence of the current recession. Observers have pointed to our long-term "Medicare" spending crisis, the importance of keeping resources available for future emergencies (e.g., think September 11 th , Katrina, the financial meltdown), the limitation some European countries face today in offering fiscal stimulus, the recent "negative outlook" on United Kingdom debt, the "bond vigilantes" that have pushed long-term bond yields up almost 1% from mid-May to mid-June as well as the concerns expressed by China, a huge investor in U.S. Treasuries. Somewhat related to this, the active intervention of the Federal Reserve in long-term fixed-income markets leads to interesting signal extraction problems associated with the informational content of prices in markets that essentially may be manipulated by the central bank by its asset purchases and for which policy uncertainty is considerable.
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A related context illustrating the importance of resource issues have been the longstanding practices of pension plans that are effectively substantially underfunded 16 At a tactical level "budgetary issues" are also important to the form of the federal response. After the initial "AIG" Congressional hearings it became clear that Congress would not approve additional appropriations for the Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) or other financial rescues. Consequently, the Obama Administration's focus for new rescue initiatives shifted to (a) tactical uses of "guarantees" (such as from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)) that would not require up-front appropriations, though economically equivalent to direct lending, as well as (b) use of resources of the Federal Reserve, which is outside the Congressional "appropriation process." While fair value and concerns about "off-balance sheet" accounting have dominated much of the discussion about the health of our financial institutions, the federal government itself is not subject to fair value accounting and doesn't consolidate its accounts. This is not a call for consolidation of all federal accounts, however. Even absent consolidation, many observers have expressed concern about threats to the independence of the Federal Reserve. 17 Analogously, such concerns also arise with respect to efforts to influence foreign exchange pricing by central banks. The theoretical analysis of such problems in asset markets began with the pioneering study by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . because they discount liabilities at an expected return that improperly adjusts for risk.
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This is one aspect of the financial crisis that I appreciated in advance. In a speech while I served as the SEC's chief economist I pointed to the inevitability of underfunding of pension plans with fixed liabilities and substantial equity holdings and the problematic aspect of essentially projecting asset returns at too high a level. 
Predictability and Government Policy
An important theme to explore with respect to government policy is the central role of When the Treasury was questioned how it would intervene it told Congress that it needed flexibility rather than committing to the level in the capital structure in which it would intervene. But one of the central tenets from Kydland and Prescott (1977) is that while flexibility can be useful in a game against nature, it can be a false virtue in a game against active participants. When the Treasury said that it needed a "Big Bazooka" in seeking a huge funding authorization to intervene, intervention became very likely and any ability to obtain further private funding disappeared because of the lack of clarity about which financial claims would be protected. For example, how would sub-ordinated debt be treated relative to new federal claims? The answer would have been crucial to the ability to obtain private funding at that level.
A different type of example illustrating the effect of the lack of predictability was the Treasury's decision last fall to not proceed with the original formulation of the Troubled Asset Recovery Program. This was originally marketed to Congress as an attempt to 21 In the aftermath of its collapse, the leadership of Lehman Brothers has been strongly criticized for not being sufficiently aggressive in seeking capital. The Federal Reserve has emphasized that it did not have legal authority to intervene for Lehman Brothers, but, of course, it aggressively used its Section 13(3) emergency authority with respect to Bear Stearns and AIG.
remove troubled assets from the banks, akin to a "good bank, bad bank" solution. A key aspect of that program that never was resolved was the "pricing" and selection of assets-in that sense the program's effective cancellation was arguably not unexpected.
Yet still when the Treasury announced in November 2008 that it would not move forward with the plan, the market declined by about 5% and financial services firms declined more sharply. It's interesting to reflect upon potential causes of this large decline and so I'll suggest several-(a) the market thought the plan would have been effective and was disappointed that the plan was being abandoned; (b) the market concluded the Treasury was intellectually disorganized, though some may have thought that was already apparent and (c) financial institutions had responded to the "head fake" from the Treasury and rather than selling had been accumulating (and ex post overpaying for) the "toxic assets"
that they had anticipated later selling to the Treasury. Interestingly, there was a similar size price decline when the current Treasury didn't delivery on a "plan" in February 2009
that the President had publicly declared ready. 22 As with the prior Treasury, it's not obvious that this plan has obtained a lot of traction.
23
The issue of changes in the "rules of the game" has emerged in a variety of contexts. For example, this spring Congress debated "cram-down," the possibility of altering bankruptcy rules on primary residences to allow bankruptcy judges to reduce the obligation on mortgages for primary residences, though the proposal then was defeated by the Senate after passage by the House of Representatives. The current rules prevent a judge from doing so, making it easier for prospective homeowners to obtain financing.
Still arguably the current rules might not be the best bankruptcy standards for future loans, but yet remarkably the House only addressed past loans because some in Congress did fear the impact on future borrowing opportunities for homeowners. It's important to respect the sanctity of contract and the rules of the game-if the rules are to be changed, one should focus upon future rather than past contracts, the opposite of the House action.
Of course, approving a change for the past would not eliminate concerns of future lenders since they could reasonably forecast similar actions in the future. The issue of "rules of the game" has been a common theme recently and also includes such examples as extraordinary (and even questionable) pressure on AIG traders from the Congress and the New York Attorney General to return compensation, the treatment of automobile bondholders relative to UAW (United Automobile Workers) claimants in bankruptcy and unexpected rules about compensation and personnel restrictions for TARP recipients.
Many TARP recipients concluded earlier this year that there were large tangible indirect costs to having received such funds, unlike discount window support by the Federal
Reserve or issuance of FDIC-backed debt in 2008-9. 24 25 This provided a strong incentive to repay, which may not be undesirable, but also illustrates the types of strings that can be 24 These include scolding by Congress, restrictions on events and activities, retroactive restrictions on compensation and the ability to obtain H1-b visas, for example for graduates of American programs of higher education. These personnel aspects suggest significant competitive issues because many of the relevant business competitors were not TARP recipients (including foreign institutions). 25 Since these costs are discontinuous-a firm is either a TARP recipient or it is not-the repayments of TARP funds tend to be all or none. associated with a "silent partner". However, this would be disadvantageous to the extent that the government feels that participation in the TARP is crucial to how it hopes to manage systemic risk.
Capital Injections, Bank Supervision and Systemic Risk
Traditionally, secured borrowing by banks at the Federal Reserve's discount bank as "lender of last resort" has been treated as private, so as to avoid creating "stigma" for the borrowing institution. In contrast, borrowing under the TARP program was public information. In fact, with respect to stigma there would not have been a strong incentive originally to keep the information private because in the fall institutions felt that participating in the TARP was positive news because the Treasury considered them strong enough to loan them money. 26 Indeed, the applications for TARP funds from weak institutions were rejected to force them to merge or close as the private debt markets were essentially closed. 27 In effect, there was "reverse stigma" associated with receiving TARP funds.
But then the rules for recipients of TARP funds changed. Consequently, relatively strong institutions were anxious to withdraw from TARP and many went to the private markets to signal their access to funds, creating stigma or adverse selection for those who could not. Earlier this spring the Treasury and the Fed were reluctant to specify guidelines for 26 Seemingly less costly terms were charged by TARP than by private markets-to see this just compare the TARP terms to those in Warren Buffet's loan to Goldman Sachs. This reflected in part differences in the bid-ask spread as Goldman contacted Buffet, while the Treasury wanted to loan to a broad group of nine institutions at uniform terms (Buffet was a patient buyer, while the Treasury was an impatient one). Of course, another reason that Buffet could have been able to obtain advantageous terms is because of the certification that he provided to Goldman. 27 An example along such lines was the rejection of National City's request for TARP funds and the approval of PNC Bank's request to facilitate its purchase of National City.
repayment, but that should have been reflected in the ex ante design. While there has been concern about whether allowing repayment would create stigma for others, the situations of many of the institutions now may have become much clearer and indeed, the original nine TARP recipients had been strongly discouraged from declining by the Treasury and even faced threats of supervisory actions, if they had done so.
There's been much discussion about "stress tests" by the federal supervisors. One nice feature of the stress tests is that there was a greater effort to achieve uniformity than previously, which is a significant enhancement of the traditional supervision model. One curious aspect is that it was not decided up front whether the results should be public; yet this would seem to be a fundamental aspect of the ex ante design. Of course, traditional supervisory reports are typically not public, but unlike the stress tests their timing is not announced in advance by senior policymakers. It was not viable to hide the stress test results in light of the public announcement of upcoming tests, the focus on financial institutions adding new capital and even the structure of securities disclosure rules.
Furthermore, the underlying economics highlighted the value of separating "good" banks rather than permitting adverse selection to infect all institutions. The rollout of the stress results also was striking in light of the variety of leaks of partial results-for other corporate events, such as earnings announcements, this surely would have triggered investigations of stock price manipulation. Surprisingly, stress tests hadn't previously been undertaken by the bank supervisors though it would appear to be central to supervision; of course, the distinction between solvency and stress analyses is somewhat limited because optimal capitalization should be determined by stress scenarios. It is striking that there wasn't more skepticism about the outcome of the stress test because of the Fed's vested interest in the outcome, whether the underlying stress scenario was substantially adverse and the lack of a clearly defined disclosure policy. A final observation about the stress tests-if the goal was to spur lending it is not obvious that one should tell lenders that they are subject to (a) new tests and implicitly that (b) the new tests can be harder in the future-after all these could encourage contraction of lending by the banks for a given state of the economy.
The management of stress tests illustrates the potential for conflict in goals between trying to reduce systemic risk and refereeing the system. Another recently discussed example is tied to the Bank of America acquisition of Merrill in which supervisory preferences about the merger from a systemic risk perspective may have at least indirectly encouraged violations of our disclosure framework. This is another context in which there could be value to designing the system so that pre-commitment is achieved.
In the midst of a financial market crisis, policymakers are inclined to view moral hazard as an issue for "another day." While policymakers are undoubtedly quite busy that's still a misguided perspective. The option value from excess risk-taking is especially high when the value of an enterprise is low or its fundamental riskiness is high. Japan's "zombie" institutions in the 1990s are an interesting example, which points to the relevance of the corporate finance "debt overhang" problem and the potential usefulness of a "good bank"/ "bad bank" solution.
While regulators during the crisis have emphasized that some institutions are too big or interconnected to fail, regulators are not focusing sufficiently upon the ex ante costs associated with systemic risks and have been reluctant to seriously engage on limiting the ex ante risk-taking costs associated with the government's safety-net policies and subsidies, including restricting bank size. 28 An interesting related example is how the takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, which had been viewed last summer by the authorities as one of the strongest institutions, nearly brought down Bank of America.
This merger, encouraged by the federal authorities with only a modest time frame for due diligence, also illustrates that the distinction between ex ante and ex post consequences is not a sharp one-yesterday's ex post decisions are ex ante ones that set the stage for our future. Since recent proposals highlight the creation of a systemic risk regulator, it is interesting to reflect on the effectiveness of past supervision. For example, the Federal
Reserve was Citigroup's consolidated supervisor under current law and yet Citigroup still essentially collapsed and required a $300 billion federal guarantee (excluding a deductible and 10% coinsurance). Designating institutions as too important to fail could add to systemic risk by reducing market discipline. However, an important step forward in my view would be the development of plans for the resolution and unwinding of significant institutions, if it actually encouraged the unwinding of institutions that failed financially (also see footnote 20).
Concluding Comments
I'd like to conclude by pointing to some of the challenges that our economy faces and to which the research of financial economists can contribute considerably:
 How can we design mortgage instruments and allocate risk-bearing in light of the value of loans modifications and the commonality in housing values?
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 How can we make progress on restoring market discipline and allowing failure?
 How can we reduce systemic risk, including the portion that is a consequence of government guarantees?
 Can insolvency resolution be improved? Should we be comfortable with relatively more ad hoc handling of bankruptcies? When should resolution by bankruptcy be avoided?
 How do we distinguish liquidity vs. solvency challenges? Is there any meaningful economic distinction?
 How can the structure of compensation arrangements be enhanced?
 How should regulatory shopping be limited when the diversity of contexts suggests the value of different types of regulation?
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 How can we mitigate adverse selection about counterparty risk among financial institutions and adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the loan origination process?
 How do we adjust to limited societal resources?
29 Perhaps the earliest paper on optimal loan modification, though cast in the context of prepayment rather than default, is Dunn and Spatt (1985) . 30 For example, regulatory shopping in the context of credit rating shopping is explored by Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) .
